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Abstract 
 
The  N-variant  architecture  combines  redundancy 
and  diversity  to  provide  secretless  security  for  a 
computer  system.  In  this  paper,  we  present  a  new 
model  of  N-variant  systems.  This  model  generalizes 
previous work and establishes constructive guidelines 
for future N-variant systems. Our model characterizes 
the  components  of  an  N-variant  system  and  the 
properties they have. In particular, the model reveals 
four types of vulnerabilities that all N-variant systems 
should  address  explicitly.  Analysis  of  existing  N-
variant  systems  with  respect  to  these  vulnerability 
types yields useful insights that can be used to harden 
these  systems,  and  to  construct  further  N-variant 
systems. 
1. Introduction 
An N-variant system can guarantee certain security 
properties  without  requiring  a  secret  such  as  a 
password, an encryption key, or details of the software 
in  use  or  the  system  architecture  [2,  4,  5,  6].  This 
characteristic is referred to as secretless security. The 
value of secretless security is considerable, because it 
eliminates  a  serious  practical  difficulty,  keeping  a 
secret.  The  ability  to  design  systems  with  security 
properties that are secretless is attractive, and that was 
the primary motivation for development of the model.  
We sought an approach that would allow us to develop 
N-variant  systems  starting  with  the  desired  security 
properties and the goal of their secretless enforcement. 
The  security  properties  of  a  specific  N-variant 
system derive from the components and architecture of 
that system. In this paper, we present a model of N-
variant  systems  that  shows  how  security  properties 
derive  from  the  system  architecture.  This  model 
generalizes previous work and establishes constructive 
guidelines  for  building  an  N-variant  system  based 
upon the security properties desired for that system. In 
addition,  the  model  identifies four types of potential 
vulnerabilities  to  which  all  N-variant  systems  are 
subject and which all N-variant systems must address. 
Previous  work  introduced  concepts  and 
components that were specific to particular N-variant 
systems.  That  work  helped  to establish properties of 
and made security arguments for certain types of N-
variant systems, but the results did not allow for the 
design of an N-variant system to be determined by a 
set of desired security properties. Here, we provide a 
model  that  establishes  properties  for  all  N-variant 
systems  and  permits  their  analysis.  The  model  also 
provides a link between desired properties and the N-
variant  architecture  needed  to achieve them, thereby 
serving as a guide from which to create new N-variant 
systems. 
In the next section, we review the N-variant system 
concept, and then we present our general model for N-
variant systems. Next, we present analyses of existing 
N-variant  systems  using  the  model.  Finally,  we 
present our conclusions and discuss future work. 
2. N-Variant System Overview 
The  N-variant  architecture  combines  redundancy 
and diversity to secure a computer system. Artificial 
diversity is applied to two or more (i.e., N) instances 
of the same system to create system variants that are 
then  executed  with  identical  data  and  under  the 
control  of  a  monitor.  Execution  is  usually 
synchronized  and  in  parallel,  although  it  does  not 
have  to  be.  The  diversity  is  tailored  so  that  the 
exploitation  sets  of  the  two  system  variants  are 
disjoint. 
Tailored  diversity  allows  N-variant  systems  to 
provide  guarantees  against  specific  attack  classes. 
Strong  arguments  can  be  made  with  respect  to  the 
protected  attack class, regardless of the vulnerability 
being  exploited.  As  a  result,  known  vulnerabilities 
need not be eliminated in order to maintain protection. 
The  diversity  between  the  variants  means  that  an 
attack (from the class for which protection is offered) 
which exploits one of the variants will not have the    
same effect on any other variant. With an appropriate 
monitor in place, any of these attacks will be detected. 
The  artificial  diversity  that  is  used  in  N-variant 
systems  is data diversity [1]. Data diversity changes 
the representation of information algorithmically from 
its original form to a new form using a process called 
data reexpression. Provision usually has to be made in 
the  program  that  will  process  the  data  to  operate 
correctly with the reexpressed data. One approach is to 
reverse the reexpression before the data is used, and a 
second  is  to  adjust  the  program  to  work  with  the 
reexpressed data. Data diversity can be applied to any 
data stream within a system. In an N-variant system, 
data  diversity  is  applied  specifically  to  the  data 
streams that are vulnerable to manipulation by attacks. 
In  a  conventional  system,  an  attack  exploits  a 
vulnerability  in  one  part  of  the  system  to  pass 
malicious  data  to  another  part  of  the  system.  For  a 
given attack, an N-variant system provides protection 
because  there  are  always  at  least  two  variants  that 
must do the same thing but their internal data streams 
are  diverse.  The  internal  data  streams  have  been 
subject  to  different  data  reexpressions,  and  so  a 
successful  attack  requires  that  two  different  data 
streams be modified by one malicious payload.  
As  an  example,  consider  a  memory  overwrite 
attack  that  exploits  a  vulnerability  in  a  program  to 
pass  malicious  data  through  that  program  to  the 
hardware that is executing the program. An N-variant 
system  could  be  constructed  to  use  address  space 
partitioning to thwart such memory overwrites [4]. In 
such  a  system,  two  variants  execute  in  disjoint 
memory  regions.  On  normal  (non-malicious)  input, 
the  system  behaves  as  it  did  originally.  However, 
consider malicious input that gains access to memory 
and  overwrites a memory location using an absolute 
address. Such an attack might operate as the attacker 
desired in one variant, but the attack will not do so in 
the other variant because the hardware addressing is 
different, i.e., the address will be out of bounds. Figure 
1 illustrates a program P with addresses relocated such 
that a valid absolute memory reference in one variant 
is  guaranteed  to  be  invalid  in  the  other.  In  this 
example,  the  data  that  was  reexpressed  was  the 
program binary, and the reexpression was to change 
the representation of absolute addresses. 
3. N-Variant System Model 
3.1. Model Structure 
A traditional system and an N-variant version with 
N=2 are illustrated in Figure 2. Figure 2a shows the 
structure  of  the  traditional  system  in  which  the 
vulnerable component, referred to as the data source, 
is  shown  connected  to  a  single  separate  component, 
referred to as the data sink. The data sink is the target 
of  the  attacks  of  interest,  and  the  mechanism  of  an 
attack is to exploit a vulnerability in the data source to 
manipulate the data being passed from the data source 
to  the  data  sink.  Figure  2b  is  an  N-variant  system 
derived from the original system of Figure 2a. 
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An  N-variant  system  is  composed  of  five 
components: (1) a polygrapher; (2) the data sources; 
(3)  the  data  sinks; (4) a monitor; and (5) an output 
merger. The functionalities of the components are: 
Polygrapher:  The  polygrapher  replicates  and  routes 
inputs, labeled U in Figure 2, to the data source for 
each variant.  
Data  Sources:  Each data source implements part of 
the  system  functionality.  The  data  source  is 
supplemented in various ways to support the necessary 
data reexpression. 
Data Sinks: Each data sink also implements part of 
the system functionality. The reexpressed output data 
produced by each data source, labeled D` and D`` in 
Figure  2b,  is  passed  to  the  corresponding  variant’s 
data sink.  
Monitor: In the N-variant framework, processing of 
the  reexpressed  data  by the data sinks will result in 
divergent  behavior  on abnormal (attack) inputs. The 
monitor observes the behavior of both data sinks and 
raises  an  alarm  when  their  behaviors  diverge.  A 
divergence might be manifested as information from 
the  data  sinks  that  differs  or  execution  states of the 
data sinks that differ. 
Output  Merger:  The  output  merger  combines  the 
outputs from the N data sinks, labeled O in Figure 2b, 
into a single system output. This is necessary so that 
the N-variant system behaves as a single logical entity 
from the point of view of any clients of the system. 
3.2. Data Source Structure 
Figure  3a  shows  the  structure  of  a  data  source. 
Each variant is created by modifying the original data 
source  so  that  it  applies  data  diversity  to  its  output 
data stream. The form of diversity used depends on the 
security requirements. 
Each data source is modeled as five segments: (1) 
input data, labeled U; (2) output data, labeled D; (3) 
software  vulnerabilities,  categorized  into  three  types 
labeled I, II, III; (4) the output location, labeled X; and 
(5)  a  data  reexpression  mechanism,  labeled  RexD or 
RexS (signifying dynamic and static data reexpression, 
respectively).  The  functionalities  of  these  segments 
are: 
Input  and  output  data:  The  input  data  U  typically 
comes  from  external  sources  and  is  untrusted.  The 
reexpressed  output  data  D  is  sent  to  the  target  data 
sink. 
Output  location:  The  location  where  output  is  last 
held by the data source before being passed to the data 
sink. This models the way data is written to the data 
channel between source and sink. 
Vulnerabilities:  Any  malicious  payload  will  target 
software vulnerabilities in the data sources in an effort 
to control the input to the target data sinks. There are 
three types of vulnerabilities that can be present in the 
data source. They are illustrated as circles in Figure 3a 
with arrows showing the paths of malicious data. The 
vulnerability types are discussed further in Section 3.4. 
Data reexpression mechanism: Each data source has 
a  reexpression  mechanism  that  it  uses  to  apply 
diversity  to  the  information  being  protected.  The 
reexpression  mechanism is labeled as RexD or RexS. 
Reexpression  can  be  applied  dynamically at runtime 
(RexD), statically by encoding reexpressed information 
into  the  data  source  program  (RexS),  or  by  a 
combination of the two. 
RexD  is  a  runtime  function  that  converts  trusted 
data  to  a  reexpressed  form.  RexS  is  effected  by  a 
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transformation  of  the  original  data  source  program. 
RexS is a static transformation that modifies the data 
source to operate on reexpressed data. Additionally, all 
operations  on  reexpressed  data  are  transformed  to 
preserve the original semantics, if necessary. 
The  data  sources  must  have  several  important 
properties to ensure the effectiveness of the N-variant 
system. They are: 
  All information applicable to the desired security 
property must be reexpressed.  
  The  reexpression  functions  used  by  the  variants 
should be disjoint. This means that for all possible 
pieces  of  trusted  information,  the  data  sources 
reexpress them differently. If they are not disjoint, 
then the protection obtained is not guaranted. 
  The  N  data  sources  must  be  functionally 
equivalent and operate in semantically equivalent 
states on normal (non-malicious) input. 
3.3. Data Sinks 
Figure 3b shows the structure of a data sink. Each 
data  sink  is  modeled  as  four  segments:  (1)  input, 
labeled  D;  (2)  output,  labeled  O;  (3)  software 
vulnerabilities,  labeled  IV;  and  (4)  an  inverse 
reexpression mechanism, labeled InvD or InvS. 
Input and output: The input data D is the reexpressed 
data from the data source. The output data O goes to 
the output merger to become the system output. 
Vulnerabilities: There is a fourth type of vulnerability 
in the data sink that we discuss in Section 3.4. 
Inverse  reexpression  mechanism:  The  data  sink 
must operate with the reexpressed data that it receives. 
To  do  this,  the  data  sink  can  reverse  the  data 
reexpression  of  its  input,  or  the  data  sink  can  be 
constructed to operate on the reexpressed data. These 
two options are shown in Figure 3b as InvD and InvS. 
InvD is a runtime function that accepts reexpressed 
information as input and produces the original form as 
output. InvS represents a transformation of the original 
data sink. InvS is a static transformation that modifies 
the  data  sink  to  operate  on  reexpressed  data.  Like 
RexS,  InvS  is  effected  by  a  transformation  of  the 
original  data  sink  program.  All  operations  on 
reexpressed  data  are  transformed  to  preserve  the 
original semantics, if necessary. 
3.4. Effects and Treatment of Vulnerabilities 
Recall  that  N-variant  systems  are  subject  to  four 
types  of  vulnerabilities  identified  in  Section  3.2 and 
Section 3.3. 
Type I – Data Source output manipulation: The 
first type allows an adversary to manipulate the output 
value  of  the  data  source.  An  attack  on  this 
vulnerability  causes  the  data  source  to  send 
unintended output to the data sink. N-variant security 
is designed to eliminate Type I vulnerabilities because 
the output location is identical in all N data sources. 
An  attack  is  thus  constrained  to  overwrite  N  output 
locations  with  the  same  attack  data.  Because  of 
disjoint reexpression, this will always fail to be correct 
in  at  least  one  of  the  variants.  Thus  attacks on this 
type of vulnerability will always be detected. N-variant 
systems  are  explicitly  designed  to  combat  Type  I 
vulnerabilities.  
Type  II  –  Malicious  data  reexpression:  The 
second vulnerability type allows malicious data to be 
reexpressed  by  the  data  source  on  behalf  of  the 
adversary. This can occur when the data source uses a 
dynamic reexpression mechanism. If an attacker can 
inject data into the execution sequence that uses the 
reexpression function, then the attacker can reexpress 
his  malicious  data  correctly  in  all  variants.  Type  II 
vulnerabilities become relevant in the decision of how 
the reexpression is done. Any dynamic reexpression is 
susceptible  to  Type  II  vulnerabilities,  while  only  a 
completely static transformation of the data source is 
immune to them.  
Type III – System component interference: The 
third  vulnerability  type  allows  malicious  data  to 
interfere  with  other  components  of  the  N-variant 
system. This vulnerability type is illustrated in Figure 
2b as arrows leading out of the data source because it 
can possibly affect any other component in the system. 
Type  III  vulnerabilities  usually  become  hazardous 
when components are not properly isolated. In these 
cases,  the  designer  of  the  N-variant  system  must 
provide  sufficient  protection  against  Type  III 
vulnerabilities  or  arguments  for  why  they  are  not  a 
security threat. 
Type  IV  –  Overwriting  reverse  reexpression 
mechanism  output:  The  fourth  vulnerability  type  is 
present in the data sink and allows malicious data to 
overwrite  the  output  of  a  reverse  reexpression 
mechanism. If an attacker can overwrite this output, 
then the attacker can bypass the security afforded by 
reexpression  and  deliver  malicious  data  to  the  data 
sink.  Type IV vulnerabilities become relevant in the 
decision of how the inverse reexpression is done. Any 
dynamic inverse reexpression is susceptible to Type IV 
vulnerabilities,  while  only  a  completely  static 
transformation of the data sink is immune to them.    
4. Analysis of N-Variant Systems 
In  this  section,  we  present  an  analysis  of  two 
existing  N-variant  systems  using  our  model  as  a 
guiding  framework.  The  first  N-variant  system  we 
consider  was  developed  to  thwart  critical  data 
corruption attacks [5]. The second system we consider 
was the Orchestra system, developed to thwart attacks 
that relied on knowledge of the stack layout [6].  
4.1. UID Variations   
Chen  et.  al  demonstrated  the  viability  of  non-
control  data  attacks,  i.e.,  attacks  that  overwrite 
security-critical data such as user-identification (UID) 
variables,  configuration  data  and  decision-making 
data, without altering the control flow of the exploited 
program [3]. Inspired by this work, Nguyen-Tuong et. 
al  demonstrated  how  N-variant  systems  could  be 
constructed  to  thwart  such  attacks,  using  user-
identification data as a demonstration vehicle [5]. 
Attacks that corrupt UID values could result in an 
attacker  masquerading  as  any  user  in  a  system,  in 
particular the root user on a Unix system.  To thwart 
this attack, a 2-variant system was developed in which 
all  UID  values were reexpressed in a program (data 
source) and the operating system (data sink) was made 
aware of this data reexpression. The reexpression used 
in  one  variant  was  the  identity  function,  while  the 
reexpression  used  in  the  other  variant  was  the 
function: Rex(uid) = uid  0x7FFFFFF. This function 
was selected explicitly so that for all memory locations 
in  a  program  that  stored  UID  values,  the  encoding 
would  result  in  a  bit  pattern  that  differed  in  all 
positions except the most significant bit.
1 Any attack 
that  overwrote  a  memory  location  containing a UID 
value would result in the monitor detecting divergence 
once  the  inverse  reexpression  function  was  applied. 
Thus  Type  I  vulnerabilities  were  thwarted  except  in 
the unlikely case that an attacker was able to overwrite 
the most significant bit of a UID value. Furthermore, 
to  detect  potential  divergence  immediately  after  the 
use of UID values, calls that manipulate UID values 
are implemented as system calls. The monitor in the 
framework automatically raises an alarm when system 
calls (or their arguments) differ.   
Type  II  vulnerabilities  were  not  explicitly 
recognized  as  such  in  the  original  design.  At  first 
glance, only static changes are necessary to reexpress 
                                                        
1 Ideally the XOR mask would have been 0xFFFFFFFF 
so  that all bits would differ across the variants. However 
because of kernel implementation details we did not use the 
most significant bit.  
UID  values  in  the  source  code  of  the  program. 
However,  the  mapping  of  user  names  to  user 
identification  variables  is  stored  in  two  system  files 
(/etc/passwd  &  /etc/group)  and  requires  a  dynamic 
lookup.  Potentially,  a  Type  II  vulnerability  could  be 
exploited to overwrite the input to the lookup function 
(a string), and the results of this lookup would be the 
correct  reexpressed  UID  for  both  variants.  In  other 
words, the attacker could potentially control the UID 
value in both variants.  
Type III vulnerabilities are absent because the data 
source, i.e., the vulnerable program, is implemented as 
a process and therefore isolated from the rest of the 
system. Type IV vulnerabilities potentially exist as the 
inverse  reexpression  is  performed  dynamically. 
However, the inverse reexpression is quite simple (an 
XOR function) and strong arguments can be made as 
to its correctness and security. 
4.2. Stack Reversal 
The  Orchestra  system  uses  stack  reversal  as  the 
reexpression algorithm for generating diverse variants 
[6].  In  one  variant,  the  stack  grows  conventionally 
downwards, whereas in the other it grows upwards. To 
effect  this  transformation,  the  Orchestra  compiler 
emits code in which the stack is reversed. Thus, both 
the data source and the data sink are derived statically 
from the original source program. The data source in 
this case produces stack activation records while the 
data sink consumes them. 
The motivation for this reexpression strategy is to 
thwart  attacks  that  rely  on  the  stack  layout,  e.g., 
attacks  that  target  the  return  address,  by  making  it 
likely that an attack would make the program variants 
diverge. However, Type I vulnerabilities are mitigated 
only to the extent that such an argument can be made 
convincingly. While intuitively it makes sense that a 
corrupted  activation  record  will  quickly  result  in  a 
system divergence, i.e., the system calls differ or the 
same  system  call  is  presented  with  different 
arguments,  it  is  actually  possible  for  an  attacker  to 
launch an attack that succeeds on both variants. Thus, 
as  the  authors  suggest,  complementary  defenses 
should be used if additional protection is desired.  
Because  of  the  static  transformations  effected  by 
the  Orchestra  compiler  to  produce  the  variants,  the 
system  should  be  immune  to  Type  II  and  Type  IV 
vulnerabilities.  This  should  be  confirmed  by  an 
analysis  of  the  code  generated  by  the  compiler  to 
ensure  the  absence  of  dynamic  reexpressions.  For 
example,  if  there  existed  logic  in  the  variants  that 
inspected program state and made decisions based on 
whether  the  variant  had  an  upward  or  downward    
stack, then an attacker could potentially harness this 
logic to carry out an attack.  
Type III vulnerabilities are explicitly addressed by 
the  Orchestra  architecture  and  the  defense  relies  on 
the  isolation  properties  guaranteed  by  the  host 
operating  system  and  its  memory  protection 
capabilities. Each variant is implemented as a process 
and is isolated from all other variants. Furthermore, a 
single  process  keeps  variants  synchronized 
(polygrapher, output merger) and detects any behavior 
divergence  at  the  granularity  of  system  calls.  This 
process  is  also  isolated  from  the  variants  except  for 
shared  memory  segments  used  to  communicate with 
the  variants.  To  prevent  vulnerable  variants  from 
overwriting  this  memory,  the  framework  uses  the 
memory protection facilities of the operating system. 
4.3. Summary of Analysis 
 Re-analyzing  two  existing  N-variant  systems  in 
light  of  the  model  yields  useful  insights.  For  those 
systems  that use dynamic data reexpression, Type II 
and  potentially  Type  IV  vulnerabilities  should  be 
addressed  carefully.  On  the  other  hand,  the  use  of 
static  data  reexpressions  yields  systems  that  are  not 
susceptible  to  Type  II  or  Type  IV  vulnerabilities. 
However, we note that Type II vulnerabilities could be 
lurking even in systems that at first glance appear to 
be immune. 
For systems that rely on probabilistic arguments to 
thwart Type I vulnerabilities, such arguments should 
be  made  carefully  to  ensure  that  attacks  cannot 
successfully be constructed that work on all variants. 
Systems that use disjoint data reexpressions can make 
fundamentally  stronger  claims  with  respect  to 
preventing Type I vulnerabilities, i.e., the nature of the 
data  reexpression  algorithms  guarantees  that  it  is 
impossible to construct attack values that are valid in 
all variants. For Type III vulnerabilities, both systems 
use  facilities  of  the  underlying  operating  system  to 
guarantee  isolation  of  the  variants  and  of  the 
monitoring process. 
5. Conclusion 
We have presented a general model for N-variant 
systems.  This  model  outlines  the  components  that 
make  up  an  N-variant  system  and  the  security 
properties  that  each  of  these  components  has.  We 
analyzed two existing N-variant systems based on the 
model and highlighted their susceptibility to the four 
vulnerability types outlined in the model. 
By  considering  the  properties  elicited  from  the 
model, designers can better develop N-variant systems 
from the security properties they desire. Furthermore, 
the  four  vulnerability  types  identified  guide  the 
analysis  of  the  security  properties  for  any  new  N-
variant systems. 
In  the  future  we  will  use  the  model  as  a  guide 
towards  constructing  further  N-variant  systems  to 
thwart additional attack classes. In particular, we will 
focus attention on web application vulnerabilities. 
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